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Abstract

On August 3, 1992, the United States Patent and Trademark Office published a notice in the Federal Register
requesting public comments on the PTO's appeal procedures. Taken in context, then, the notice can be fairly
said to raise the issue whether, under the existing statute, the Board is subservient to the Commissioner. It also
raises the broader question of whether such a subservient arrangement is desirable or, alternatively, whether
the statute should be modified if necessary to give the Board decisional independence from the
Commissioner. This Commentary is directed primarily to this latter point. In summary, it concludes that the
Commissioner, and not the Board, is inherently better suited to determine policy in the patent area. Whatever
administrative lawmaking authority exists in the patent area should therefore reside in the Commissioner.
Given this conclusion, there is little or nothing to gain from placing the adjudicatory powers of the Board
outside the Commissioner's supervision. Indeed, such a change would likely have negative effects. The most
appropriate course is therefore to continue the Board's present subservience to the Commissioner.
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Commentary: Authority of the
Commissioner Over The Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences
R. Carl Moyl

INTRODUCTION

O

n August 3, 1992, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
published a notice in the Federal Register requesting public comments on the PTO's appeal procedures. 2 The subject matter of the
notice is closely related to the controversy surrounding the Commissioner's handling of the appeals in Ex parte Alappat3 and Ex parte
Akamatsu. 4 As has been described in the trade press, 5 in each of these
cases the Commissioner appears to have actively intervened in the
appeals process. In each, a panel of the Board of patent Appeals and
Interferences (hereinafter the "Board") apparently was convened initially, without the Commissioner, to decide the appeal. Upon learning
of the decision of the original panel, the Commissioner apparently
constituted a new panel that included himself and imposed a different
/
decision. 6
Taken in context, then, the notice can be fairly said to raise the
issue whether, under the existing statute, the Board is subservient to
the Commissioner. It also raises the broader question of whether such
a subservient arrangement is desirable or, alternatively, whether the
1 Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Of Counsel, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2 Notice of Request for Public Comments; Review of PTO Appeal Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg.
34123.
3 No. 91-1277 (Apr. 22, 1992).
4 No. 91-3230 (Mar. 20, 1992).
5 E.g., Correspondence Between Board Members and PTO Commissioner on Board Independence, 44 PTCJ 33, 43 (May 14, 1992).
6 The A/appal case is now awaiting in bane decision from the Federal Circuit. See [CITE TO
PTCJ].
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statute should be modified if necessary to give the Board decisional
independence from the Commissioner.
This Commentary is directed primarily to this latter point. In
summary, it concludes that the Commissioner, and not the Board, is
inherently better suited to determine policy in the patent area. Whatever administrative lawmaking authority exists in the patent area should
therefore reside in the Commissioner. Given this conclusion, there is
little or nothing to gain from placing the adjudicatory powers of the
Board outside the Commissioner's supervision. Indeed, such a change
would likely have negative effects. The most appropriate course is
th~re.fore to continue the Board's present subservience to the CommISSIoner.
I. SEPARATING THE BOARD's ADJUDICATORY FUNCTION FROM THE
COMMISSIONER

The three major, traditional functions of administrative agencies
are rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication. 7 The PTO has no
enforcement powers with regard to matters of patent infringement. 8
Rather, by determining whether a patent should be allowed to issue
the PTO functions in the United States patent system mainly as the
decisionmaker in an initial licensing proceeding-an issued patent is
essentially a revocable license to maintain a private action for patent
infringement. 9 Thus, in the process of conducting ex parte examination of patent applications the Examining Corps essentially performs the combined functions of an adjudication lO and enforcement ll
of this initial licensing transaction. The Board performs an appellate
adjudication within the agency.
It is clearly possible to separate the Board's appellate adjudicatory function from the rest of the PTO's functions. Taking another
set of federal administrative entities as a closely related example,
Congress has empowered the Secretary of Labor, via the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA"), to investigate
7 E.g., Donovan v. Amorello, 761 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); see generally,
e.g., Asimow, The Curtain Falls: Separation of Function in the Federal Administrative Agencies,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981).
8 See Moy, Judicia~ Deference to the PTO's Interpretations of the Patent Law, 74 JPTOS 406,
nn.115-17 (1992).
9 Id. at nn. 139-40.
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (defining the decision whether to grant an initial license as an adjudication).
11 Cf., e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (describing "three hat" function
of Social Security Administration AUs to include both enforcement and adjudication).
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violations of workplace regulations and bring enforcement proceedings against violators. Congress created another agency, however,
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the "Regulatory Commission"), to adjudicate disputes over OSHA's enforcement efforts.12 Thus, there is no legal obstacle to Congress giving
the Board decisional independence from the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks. 13
II.

SEPARATION OF FUNCTION AS A CURE

Every legal rule, whether defined by adjudication or legislation,
must be interpreted before it can be applied to a given fact pattern.
Language is not self-defining; even if it were, no court or legislature
could hope to provide a set of legal rules so exhaustive as to cover
every possible factual situation~ This task of making law within a
framework of set controlling rules inevitably falls on the administrative agencies that operate in a given area. Agencies see a much larger
set of fact patterns than come before the courts or are considered by
Congress. Agencies, moreover, are on the "front line" of the law.
New fact patterns, and therefore new lawmaking demands, typically
come before the agency first and are presented to the reviewing courts
only after the agency has acted. For reasons such these, scholars in
the field of administrative law commonly accept that agencies must
make new law to some extent.
This issue is at the heart of the dispute over the Board's relationship to the Commissioner. The disputes in Alappat and Akamatsu
12 See generally e.g., Martin v. Occ. Safety § Health Rev. Comm'n., _ _U.S. _ _ ,
111 S.Ct. 1171 (1991); Donovan v. AmoreI/o, 761 F.2d 61 and authorities cited therein.
13 The analogy between the Regulatory Commission and an independent Board may also shed
some light on the issue whether the Board is already independent of the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks under the present statute. Congress created the Regulatory Commission as an
administrative entity entirely separate from the Secretary. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.Ct. at 1174;
see generally Johnson, The Split Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions From the OSHA and
MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987). The legislative history, moreover, shows a
clear Congressional desire to insulate the Regulatory Commission from the influence of the
Secretary. See, e.g., the authorities discussed in Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.Ct. at 1177·78. Section
7 of Title 35, U.S.c., and its legislative history, in contrast, appear to display neither of these
qualities. Had it desired to give the Board independence, for example, Congress could have easily
employed language similar to that in Article 23 of the European Patent Convention. ("In their
decisions the members of the Boards shall not be bound by any instructions and shall comply
only with the provisions of this Convention.") The absence of any express indication argues that
Congress did not intend for the present Board to have decisional independence from the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Indeed, it is quite common in other Federal agencies for
AUs to be under the control of the agency head. See generally, PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 9.3.6 (2d cd. 1992).
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do not center on whether the original panel of the Board applied
undisputed law to the facts correctly. Instead, the dispute is almost
entirely on whether the original panels in those cases adopted the
correct legal ruleY Clearly, then, the current dispute is whether the
Commissioner or the Board will have the lawmaking authority that
exists at the agency level. 15
The difficulty is that merely separating the Board's adjudicatory
function from the Commissioner does not settle this question. The
Board could potentially function to limit the Commissioner's lawmaking authority16 in at least two ways. First, it could be given the
power to strike down interpretive rulings of the Commissioner that
it finds either unreasonable or contrary to binding authority Y In this
way the Board could place limits on the Commissioner's lawmaking
powers that would be directly analogous to those the courts impose
when reviewing agency action. 18 Second, the Board could be given
the broad power to impose its own view of the proper interpretive
legal rule on the Commissioner. That is, the Board's view of the law
could control even in those situations where the Commissioner's
interpretation is both reasonable and consistent with the underlying
authority that is being interpreted. Presumably, the Commissioner's
interpretive actions are usually both reasonable and consistent with
authority. As a result, the first potential power of the Board is much
less significant than the second.
Merely removing the Board from the Commissioner's supervision does not necessarily confer on it this second type of power. It
is entirely possible for adjudicatory power to rest in one administrative entity and interpretive rulemaking authority to rest in another.
The Regulatory Commission in Martin, for example, despite being
14 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Alappat, slip op. at 25.
15 See generally, PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, §
9.3.6 (2d ed. 1992).
16 This Commentary assumes that the Commissioner has interpretive, but not substantive law
making authority. See Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74
JPTOS 257, nn.46-60 (1992). As a consequence, it does not consider the impact of any substantive
law-making authority that the Commissioner may have. It should be noted, however, that this
view of the Commissioner's substantive law-making authority is not held universally. See, e.g.,
AIPLA, Independence of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 2 FED. OR. BAR J.
215, 219 n.9 (1992).
17 Cf. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.O. at 1178 (noting power of the Regulatory Commission to
"assure" the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the underlying authority).
18 E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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separate from the Secretary of Labor and OSHA,19 is nonetheless
bound to apply the interpretive rules promulgated by the Secretary. 20
Simply separating the Board and its adjudicatory function from
the Commissioner, therefore, will not get at the heart of the current
debate. Instead, this can be settled reliably only by asking the question: "Which actor, the Commissioner or the Board, should have the
power to interpret the law of patents at the agency level?"
III.

THE RELATIVE LAWMAKING EXPERTISE OF THE BOARD AND
THE COMMISSIONER

The position of the two actors within the structure of the patent
system indicates that the Commissioner, and not the Board, is likely
to possess the better lawmaking abilities. The Board sees, essentially,
only ex parte proceedings on whether to issue patents and inter partes
proceedings on contested interferences. In both cases its perspective
is that of an adjudicator only. III addition, particularly with the first
class of cases, the Board sees only those application proceedings
whose initial adjudicatory decisions are appealed-certainly a small
fraction of the application proceedings that actually occur.
The Commissioner, in contrast, has experience with a much
wider range of activities. Through his supervision of the examining
corps, he comes into contact with application proceedings. These are
greater in number and arguably afford him a greater perspective than
do the few cases that come before the Board. In addition, however,
the Commissioner is exposed to a wide range of activities that find
no parallel in the Board's functions. The Commissioner, for example,
participates actively before Congress with regard to legislative matters
that touch upon the patent system. He is the primary official of the
United States in foreign negotiations that involve patent matters. He
participates in legal proceedings outside the PTO that involve PTO
matters, both before the Federal Circuit in in re appeals, and in certain
district court proceedings as either a party or an amicus. 21 Finally,
he has a much greater range of contacts with the patent bar and users
of the patent system than does the Board.
19 Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 658-59, 666, with 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 (b)(3).
20 Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.C!. 1171. Cf. also, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d
33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (AU bound by declared agency policy).
21 E.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Patlex Corp.
v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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These different qualities of the Board and the Commissioner are
inherent in their statutorily defined roles. Together, they indicate that
the Commissioner should be given primary interpretive lawmaking
power at the administrative level. He is the actor with the wider range
of experience. As a result, he should be better able in general to
balance the competing policies that are involved when selecting between competing legal rules. 22
IV. THE LAWMAKING FORMS OF THE BOARD AND THE
COMMISSIONER
In addition to these reasons of substantive administrative law,
there are purely mechanical reasons to prefer that interpretive lawmaking power reside in the Commissioner instead of the Board. The
Commissioner typically announces his interpretive decisions either as
formal rules in Title 37, C.F.R., or informal statements published in
the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINI~G PROCEDURE or the OFFICIAL
GAZETTE. Each of these formats presents the rulings in a codified,
definite, plainly visible form. The Board, in contrast, reaches its
interpretive rulings via adjudication. Legal scholars have explored
with vigor the task of discerning legal rules from a body of adjudicated decisions. The task is notoriously difficult. The dividing line
between holding and dicta, for example, is uncertain. The holdings
in different cases inevitably conflict and must be reconciled.
For these reasons, the Commissioner is likely to be more efficient than the Board in defining patent law at the agency level. This
is particularly true when one considers that many of the persons who
use the PTO's interpretive rulings routinely have no legal training. 23
It may be particularly inefficient to communi~ate the PTO's interpretations of the law of patents to these persons by adjudication.
The choice of rulemaking v. adjudication also presents other
important reasons to favor the Commissioner. If given law-making
authority, the Board, which is a 33-member body that sits in 3member panels, will inevitably find it difficult to apply consistent
legal rules to persons who are similarly situated. Rulemaking by the
Commissioner is thus more likely to be just. The notice-and-comment
procedure, which the Commissioner can use but the Board cannot,
22 Cf. Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.C!. at 1176·79.
23 Roughly half of the patent examiners in the PTO do not have law degrees. In addition, the
PTO rules of practice permit persons with technical training, but no training in law, to represent
patent applicants before the PTO.
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is moreover capable of generating a record that far surpasses anything
the Board is reasonably likely to have at its disposal. Perhaps most
importantly, rulemaking will centralize accountability for policy decisions in this area in the person of the Commissioner. Accountability
could be a severe problem with an entity as large and diffuse as the
Board.
V.

CONCLUSION

The clearly better result is to place interpretive lawmaking authority, at the agency level, in the Commissioner and not the Board.
The Commissioner knows better the competing policies that drive the
formation of the law in this area. As a direct result, his lawmaking
decisions are likely to be of a higher quality than those of the Board.
In addition, the format in which the Commissioner states his interpretive rulings carries with it inherent advantages over the adjudicative format that the Board would use.
Given this conclusion, there is little or no point to removing the
Board from the Commissioner's supervision. A separate Board that
is nonetheless bound to apply the Commissioner's rulings will have
few freedoms in addition to those the Board now possesses. An independent Board could be given the power to strike down an individual interpretive ruling of the Commissioner as either unreasonable
or contrary to higher, binding authority. In reality, however, such
occurrences are rare, and in the event that they do occur the Federal
Circuit's review of the Commissioner's rulings is likely to be an
adequate safeguard. In the much larger class of cases the Board and
the Commissioner will simply disagree over which of two competing,
reasonable interpretations is preferable. The advantage of relying on
the Commissioner's judgments in this latter class of cases is plain.
Creating an independent Board simply to address the small number
of cases in the former class would probably be unwise.
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